Breeze написал(а):
- При существующей на сегодняшней день компоновке. Которая автоматически предусматривает главный вариант: иметь возможность взять на борт две бомбы почти по тонне каждая. Но если отказаться от этой возможности - я давал вариант, который позволяет упрятать в отсеки вооружения огромное количество ракет воздух-воздух. Но большие бомбы тогда уже хрен возьмёшь!
Да, по весу бы пошло, но не смущали бы меня словечки "or" меж различных возможностей вооружения: 4 Аим-120 или 2 Джейдэм + 2 Аим-120.:???:
Одновременно данные вооружения Ф-22 соответствуют и с другими источниками, а страница предидущей картинки Ф-35 состояла из менее достоверных иероглифов.:-read:
Не существует ли некая различность в вооружении Ф-35 и Ф-35С?
Breeze написал(а):
- Она априори не будет хуже манёвренности F-16. А тот как ласточка порхает!
Комманда Ф-16 совсем удивительно не делит ето мнение.
Pierre Sprey - участвующий в развитии Ф-16:
The F-35 "is a bad deal that shows every sign of turning into a disaster", say Pierre M Sprey and Winslow T Wheeler, but programme leaders reaffirm their belief in the value of the programme. Even without new problems, the F-35 is a 'dog'. If one accepts every performance promise the DoD currently makes for the aircraft, the F-35 will be:
- Overweight and underpowered: at 49,500 lb (22,450kg) air-to-air take-off weight with an engine rated at 42,000 lb of thrust, it will be a significant step backward in thrust-to-weight ratio for a new fighter.
- At that weight and with just 460 sq ft (43 m2) of wing area for the air force and Marine Corps variants, it will have a 'wing-loading' of 108 lb per square foot. Fighters need large wings relative to their weight to enable them to manoeuvre and survive. The F-35 is actually less manoeuvrable than the appallingly vulnerable F-105 'Lead Sled' that got wiped out over North Vietnam in the Indochina War.
- With a payload of only two 2,000 lb bombs in its bomb bay - far less than US Vietnam-era fighters - the F-35 is hardly a first-class bomber either. With more bombs carried under its wings, the F-35 instantly becomes 'non-stealthy' and the DoD does not plan to seriously test it in this configuration for years.
- As a 'close air support' attack aircraft to help US troops engaged in combat, the F-35 is a non-starter. It is too fast to see the tactical targets it is shooting at; too delicate and flammable to withstand ground fire; and it lacks the payload and especially the endurance to loiter usefully over US forces for sustained periods as they manoeuvre on the ground. Specialised for this role, the air force's existing A-10s are far superior.
However what, its advocates will protest with the F-35's two most prized features: its 'stealth' and its advanced avionics?
What the USAF will not tell you is that 'stealthy' aircraft are quite detectable by radar; it is simply a question of the type of radar and its angle relative to the aircraft. Ask the pilots of the two 'stealthy' F-117s that the Serbs successfully attacked with radar missiles in the 1999 Kosovo air war. As for the highly complex electronics to attack targets in the air, the F-35, like the F-22 before it, has mortgaged its success on a hypothetical vision of ultra-long range, radar-based air-to-air combat that has fallen on its face many times in real air war. The F-35's air-to-ground electronics promise little more than slicker command and control for the use of existing munitions.
А это уже говорят Tom Burbage с Локмарта и генерал-майор и отвественный за программу Ф-35 в ВВС США Charles Davis:
It's not clear why Mr. Spey chose to defile the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) programme, other than his claim of expertise in legacy fighter performance and procurement. That expertise is largely irrelevant today because that game has changed.
It is clear that he does not understand the underlying requirements of the F-35 programme, the capabilities needed to meet those requirements or the real programmatic performance of the JSF team.
Fact is: The 'dog' referred to by the author is in fact a 'racehorse'. The take-off weight reference to 49,500 lb is true but misleading as the programme brings 'traditional external fuel' internal to the F-35 for stealth reasons. The F-35 carries 18,500 lb of internal fuel which, coupled with the very low drag that results from internal carriage of weapons in the stealth mode, allows unprecedented combat radius performance.
The high thrust-to-weight ratios of the lightweight fighter programme the author remembers, did not include combat-range fuel, sensors or armament. Fighter performance demonstrated by fourth-generation aircraft in airshow manoeuvres is not relevant to performance in a combat loadout. Lightweight fighter dependence on energy management and manoeuvrability has little relevance in the threat environment for which the F-35 is being designed.
Fact: The F-35 has the most powerful single engine ever installed in a fighter, with thrust equivalent to both engines today in Eurofighter or F-18 E/F aircraft.
The conventional version of the F-35 has 9 g capability and matches the turn rates of the F-16 and F/A-18. More importantly, in a combat load, with internal carriage of [otherwise] 'external fuel, targeting sensor pods and weapons', the F-35's aerodynamic performance far exceeds all legacy aircraft equipped with a similar capability.
When the threat situation dictates that it is safe for legacy aircraft (like the ones the author references) to participate, the F-35 can carry ordnance on six external wing stations in addition to its four internal stations. External weapon clearance is part of our current test programme, contrary to the authors' claim. This racehorse can also enter the fight from any base. One of the F-35's many advantages is its ability to be stealthy whenever the situation dictates - a distinction that is absent in all fourth-generation fighters. Anyone who doubts the value of stealth need only look over the grotesquely lopsided victory-to-loss ratios of F-22s in mock combat exercises such as 'Red Flag' and 'Northern Edge'.
Fact: The F-35's data collection, integration and sharing capabilities will transform the battlespace of the future and will redefine the close air support mission. The reference to the F-117 incident in Serbia had far less to do with stealth than it did with the inability to share tactically important information. The F-35 is specifically designed to correct that deficiency...
Breeze написал(а):
- Это уж они "загибают" чрезмерно! На предельно малых скоростях она может быть и в 10 раз больше - за счёт УВТ, а на нормальных скоростях - не-а. Ну, раза в полтора ещё, максимум, - куда ни шло...
Если понятие математической формулы центростремительной силы не отказывает, то и в полтора раза в ворота не лезет. На одинаковой скорости при полторазовой "turn rate" и перегрузка в полтора раза больше должна быть. Ну а по данным она почти одинакова. :study:
Breeze написал(а):
- Не понял в этом месте??
* Average cost of a currently produced F-22A $142.7M per A/C
* The F-35A is estimated to cost $78M per aircraft
С учётом того, что Тайфун стоит более 122 миллионов долларов, это совсем немного!..
http://wapedia.mobi/en/Eurofighter_Typhoon
Unit cost GB£68.9 million, €77.7 mil.
Да у меня впечатление В ПРИНЦИПЕ, что Ф-35 критикуют: за его высокую стоимость и задержку производства до 2013 года. Ф-15с мол сейчас заменять надо, ускорить программу, так ф-35 вообще дороже Ф-22а станет, который только из-за малой продукции таким вымахал...
Breeze написал(а):
- Нет, просто они к нему объективно относятся: то, что есть, то и говорят. В российской печати описание российских самолётов - сплошной гром литавр и барабанов, поэтому спокойная аналитика из США воспринимается почти как похоронный марш... :grin:
А я думаю, что скорее кто-то хочет выпросить дополнительные Ф-22 вместо Ф-35.
